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Abigail L. Cassario: Not All Motivated Reasoning is Partisan: Perceived Vulnerability to 
Infectious Disease and Perceived Harmfulness Condition the Influence of Partisanship on 
Reasoning About COVID 19 
(Under the direction of Pamela J. Conover) 
Citizens are biased information processors, perceiving the world in line with cues sent to 
them by elites. As such, citizens might be deficient in their ability to hold elite agents responsible 
for policy failures. In this paper, I argue that an exception to this general pattern is when citizens’ 
personalities introduce accuracy goals into their reasoning and thus lead them to hold elites 
accountable. I test this argument in the context of the COVID 19 pandemic in a diverse sample 
of N = 1885 Americans, and a two-wave panel study of n = 650 Americans. I find that a 
personality construct, Perceived Vulnerability to Infectious Disease (henceforth PVD), structures 
partisans’ perceptions of how harmful COVID 19 is, with those high in PVD being more likely 
to accept evidence that the disease is deadly. The effect is particularly strong for Republicans, for 
whom a factor of PVD moderates the effect of partisanship on perceptions of virus harmfulness. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Citizens are not especially well versed in politics and most reason with partisan bias 
(Converse 1964; Jerit et al. 2006; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; 
Gaines et al. 2007; Bartels 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). This combination can potentially 
undermine the citizenry’s ability to hold elected officials responsible for their successes and 
failures in office. Intense periods of polarization, when partisans are especially motivated to 
reason with bias (e.g. Druckman et al. 2013; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), further erode 
citizen ability to enforce accountability. Although Americans’ response to COVID-19 would 
appear to be a perfect illustration of the perils of hyper-partisanship, I argue the reality is more 
complicated.   
It is true that, despite over 200,000 dead from the virus at the time of the election, 
partisans differed substantially in their appraisal of President Trump,1 but it is also noteworthy 
that twice as many Republicans disapproved of Trump’s handling of Covid-19, specifically, then 
of his job performance overall (Bycoff et al. 2020). Furthermore, an even higher percentage of 
Republicans failed to reflect Trump’s rhetoric about the virus, which consistently minimized its 
health threat (Roberts 2020). In June, a quasi-representative sample of American voters revealed 
that more than 60 percent of Republicans reported being either “somewhat” or “very” concerned 
about becoming seriously ill from COVID 19, and most acknowledged that the virus posed a 
                                                           
1 In August, for example, 74 percent of Republicans indicated that they approved of his handling 
of the crisis, compared with 5 percent of Democrats (Kirzinger et al., 2020).    
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much more serious health threat than a cold or the flu.2 In fact, over the course of 2020, a 
plurality of Republicans consistently expressed such high levels of concern despite strong 
partisan motivation to perceive things differently.  
 I argue that the pattern of who did and did not fall victim to partisan biases in reasoning 
about COVID is systematic and that the current hyper-focus on partisanship alone as the chief 
predictor of citizen response to the pandemic is not entirely warranted. My reasoning starts from 
the premise that not all motivated reasoning is partisan in nature.  While some citizens will have 
directional (e.g. partisan) goals in their reasoning about COVID-19, others will have accuracy 
goals (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992; Taber and Lodge 2006). Indeed, when people 
perceive the issue in question may have life or death consequences, the number of people 
favoring accuracy over partisanship ought to be substantial. Moreover, I argue that partisans’ 
personalities help explain who has accuracy goals in their reasoning about the coronavirus.    
Which specific personality constructs are likely to promote accuracy goals? In addressing 
this question, it is important to note that not everyone responds to health concerns the same way.  
Whether it is the seasonal flu, the common cold, or a stomach bug, some people see themselves 
as invulnerable while others believe they are magnets for viruses and bacteria. Noting this 
pattern, scholars in the field of personality psychology have determined that there are relatively 
stable individual level characteristics relating to one’s sensitivity to disease threats (Tybur et al. 
                                                           
2 One question asked respondents to respond to the question, “Americans disagree about whether 
the COVID virus poses a serious health risk to those who catch it or whether it is no more 
harmful than the flu or a cold. How much do you think most people who catch the virus suffer 
because of their infection?” on a scale ranging from 1: Not noticeably to 10- Serious illness, with 
risk of death. Another question asked respondents, “How concerned are you that you will 
become seriously ill from the coronavirus outbreak?” Subjects rated their concern on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1- Very concerned to 4- Not at all concerned. 
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2009; Oosterhoff et al. 2018; Fan and Olatunji 2013; MacSwain et al. 2009).  My focus here is 
on Perceived Vulnerability to Infectious Disease (PVD), which is related to general health 
anxiety and “disgust sensitivity” (Duncan et al. 2009). I posit that PVD, which emanates from 
outside the realm of politics (e.g. Wang et al. 2018) ought to be vital to determining which 
Americans’ will possess accuracy goals in reasoning about the pandemic in addition to 
directional, partisan goals. Those high in PVD, compared to those who are lower in PVD should 
be more likely to perceive the coronavirus as harmful, in line with scientific evidence. Likewise, 
the effect of PVD should be particularly strong for Republicans, for whom directional, partisan 
goals in reasoning would encourage them to discount the scientific evidence as to the virus’ 
seriousness.  
Finally, this chain of relationships ought to lead to judgments of political responsibility, 
even against a citizen’s favored party leaders. When innocent victims are perceived as being 
harmed (as is the case with the coronavirus when the virus is perceived as harmful), people are 
disposed towards holding an agent responsible for causing said harm (e.g. Gray et al. 2012; 
Schein and Gray 2018). I argue that when harm is perceived as a result of accuracy goals in 
reasoning, partisans should be more likely to hold party elites responsible for the harm caused by 
their policies (Kunda 1990; Redlawsk et al. 2010).  
 I test this theory both using a diverse sample of American voters conducted in June 2020 
(N=1885) and a panel study of American citizens conducted in June 2020 and late October 2020 
(n=650). Consistent with my theory, I find that PVD shapes partisans’ perceptions of how 
harmful the virus is. Also, in line with my theory, PVD’s Perceived Infectability (PI) factor 
moderates the impact of partisanship on harm perceptions.  In fact, Republicans who score high 
in PI are as likely to say they perceive the virus as deadly (in line with scientific evidence) as 
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Democrats. Next, I show that perceptions of harm are integral in shaping blame attributions. 
Those who perceive the virus as more harmful are also more likely to attribute political blame to 
the president and other elites. Finally, consistent with the motivated reasoning literature, PVD 
was associated with increases in perceived harmfulness over time, such that PVD predicted 
which voters would adjust their subjective perceptions of harm upwards, bringing them closer to 
objective evidence (e.g. Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992; Redlawsk et al. 2010).  
 In what follows, I further explicate the psychology undergirding the theory presented 
here. I next, discuss the methods used to test specific hypotheses associated with the theory, and 
finally present results and expand upon their implications. In sum, this paper demonstrates that 
the point at which accuracy wins out over directional goals in reasoning varies at the individual 
level and this variation is in part structured by voters’ personalities. When led by their 
personalities as well as partisanship to accurately perceive the virus as harmful, voters are 









CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF PARTISANSHIP IN STRUCTURING VIRUS PERCEPTIONS 
Reasoning is not purely “cognitive” in nature, motivated solely by a desire to make 
correct conclusions based on available data. Instead, affectively laden directional goals can 
influence information processing, and, in turn, the conclusions people reach (e.g. Kunda 1990).  
Kunda (1990) identifies two main motivations in reasoning.  Directional goals refer to a desire to 
reach conclusions that people, a priori, want to reach, while accuracy goals venerate reaching 
the correct conclusion (Kunda 1990; Kruglanski 1980).  When it comes to political thinking, 
partisanship tends to provide the affect that underlies directional goals (e.g. Kraft et al. 2015, 
Taber and Lodge, 2006).   
Critically, accuracy driven, and directionally driven processing are qualitatively different 
processes. Directional goals — the desire to reach a particular outcome following a reasoning 
task — influences the interpretation of information as well as the memory search that people 
engage in to support their conclusions. People employing directional goals are likely to search 
for information from memory and interpret new information as to allow them to justify 
conclusions as if they are unbiased.  In contrast, those employing accuracy goals engage in 
cognitive strategies associated with accurate interpretation of information.  Accuracy and 
directional goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). When 
circumstances trigger both directional and accuracy goals, people tend to process information in 




Accuracy and directional goals need not produce different conclusions. Directional goals can 
push people toward accurate assessments, provided the directional goal is consistent with reality.  
Let us stipulate that schools are woefully underfunded.  A liberal Democrat who is exposed to a 
message advocating increased educational spending may process the message with directional 
goals solely in mind and yet still reach the accurate conclusion that more spending is warranted, 
just as a person with only accuracy goals would. The ultimate outcome of the reasoning task 
does not always vary as a function of the cognitive strategies employed for all individuals, who 
have varying motivations and varying information available in memory. In the context of the 
COVID 19 pandemic, it is likely that many Democrats concluded that the coronavirus is deadly 
not because they were motivated by accuracy goals, but rather because in party elites established 
that their desired conclusion was that the virus is harmful (see Bisgaard and Slothus 2018). I do 
not mean to suggest that Democrats wanted the Coronavirus to be harmful, rather that partisan 
directional goals in information processing led many to perceive the virus as harmful because 
doing so was in line with their affectively driven partisan predilections because the Republican 
President was arguing otherwise. 
 Because Republican politicians, most notably President Trump tend to downplay the 
threat caused by the virus, often even suggesting the virus is no worse than the flu (Shabad 
2020), a Republican’s directional goal would be to reach the conclusion that Covid 19 is not 
harmful. Unlike for Democrats, for whom accuracy and (partisan) directional goals in reasoning 
about the Coronavirus lead to the same outcome, Republicans’ accuracy, and directional goals in 
reasoning lead to disparate conclusions. Accuracy goals result in the conclusion that the virus is 
serious, whereas directional goals lead to the conclusion the virus is not particularly harmful. 
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 Evidence in support of this mechanism is widespread in the extant literature. Previous 
studies on partisan attitudes about the Coronavirus indicated that Republicans overall perceived 
the virus as less serious a threat than Democrats (e.g. Alcott 2020), with Republicans and 
Independents showing more variability in their perceptions than Democrats (Alcott, 2020; 
Gadarian et al., 2020). This is consistent with the notion that directional and accuracy driven 
goals led Democrats to the same conclusion, but that for Republicans, these two goals in 
reasoning drove perceptions in opposite directions. 
 Based on the theory presented here, I propose that the impact of partisan motivated 
reasoning on rank-and-file voters’ perceptions of COVID 19 harmfulness should be as follows: 
H1: Overall, Democrats will perceive the virus as more harmful, and Republicans will see the 










CHAPTER 3: ACCURACY GOALS AND HARM PERCEPTIONS 
It is a well-established scientific fact that COVID 19 is much more harmful than a cold or 
the flu (Maragakis 2020). Moreover, as the pandemic has continued, the ability of Republicans in 
particular to use information in a manner consistent with directional goals has been constrained. 
Indeed, even Fox News host Tucker Carlson acknowledged the seriousness of the virus in June 
2020 (Bursyztyn et al. 2020). Near capacity hospitals and ICUs throughout the country make 
believing the virus is harmless more difficult.  
 Directional goals in partisan motivated reasoning are undergirded by four cognitive 
processes, namely confirmation bias, prior attitude bias, disconfirmation bias, and polarization 
bias (Taber and Lodge 2006). Implicit here is that individuals vary in their ability to engage in 
these cognitive strategies. I argue that this individual level variation is systematic, and in part 
structured by partisan’s personalities. 
 Some individuals perceive themselves to be susceptible to infectious diseases, while 
others feel they are invulnerable. Noting this variation, personality psychologists have long 
posited that relatively stable, meaningful individual differences exist with regard to perceived 
susceptibility to infectious disease. Early researchers identified constructs such as “disgust 
sensitivity,” believed to be an evolved tendency towards to disease threats (e.g. Navarrete and 
Fessler 2006; Haidt et al. 1994; Olatunji et al. 2007; Schaller and Park 2011; Schaller 2015). 
Although the construct proved useful, its measurement and theoretical grounding proved 
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problematic, as the stereotypically “disgusting” stimuli scholars used to construct their measures 
failed to relate to disease threats in practice (Duncan et al. 2009).  
 Believing that individual differences in perceived susceptibility to disease were 
meaningful, but poorly measured, Duncan and her colleagues (2009) developed the construct 
Perceived Vulnerability to Infectious Disease (henceforth PVD), which they conceptualize as 
“beliefs about personal susceptibility to the transmission of infectious disease and emotional 
discomfort in the presence of potential disease transmission (2009, 541).” The construct is 
comprised of two distinct but moderately correlated factors. The first factor, Germ Aversion 
(GA), captures the affective discomfort that accompanies realistic disease threats, and is more 
closely related to disgust sensitivity (e.g. Haidt et al. 1994; Olatunki et al. 2007; Navarrete and 
Fessler 2006). The second factor, Perceived Infectability, is more closely related to the 
dispositional trait of Neuroticism and constructs such as health anxiety. It encompasses beliefs 
about one’s susceptibility to infectious disease (e.g. Lucock and Morley 1996; Pilowsky 1967). 
Notably, to capture the construct Duncan and her colleagues (2009) use a measure comprised of 
items that correspond to actual infectious disease threats, rather than stereotypes.  
 Neither factor of PVD is directly related to partisanship in the US context scholars have 
argued that PVD should become politically relevant in the presence of a realistic disease threat in 
the environment (e.g. Wang et al. 2018). I argue that PVD has become politically relevant in the 
context of the COVID 19 pandemic by creating the presence of accuracy goals in reasoning 
about COVID harmfulness for those high in the construct. These accuracy goals in turn impede 
the ability of partisans, especially Republicans, to engage in the cognitive strategies necessary 
for directional goals in reasoning to prevail. In short, PVD makes partisans feel as though the 
stakes of their correct reasoning about COVID is higher, and thus those partisans high in PVD 
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are more likely to have accuracy goals win out in their reasoning. For Republicans, this effect 
should be particularly pronounced as partisan directional and accuracy goals in reasoning in this 
context lead to disparate conclusions. Based on this logic, I posit:  
H2a: PVD will shape perceptions of COVID 19’s harmfulness.  
















CHAPTER 4: AFFECTIVE TIPPING POINTS 
Throughout the course of the pandemic, new information has come to light about the 
virus and its effects on its victims. For instance, early in the pandemic, scientists and laypeople 
alike thought the virus was typically associated primarily with fever and dry cough. Later, it 
became apparent that the virus was associated with a range of symptoms ranging from loss of 
taste and smell to severe cognitive impairment (e.g. Moein et al. 2020; Morley 2020). Moreover, 
while initially it was thought that the victims that recover from COVID recovered fully and had 
some immunity to the virus, later it was found that many COVID survivors suffered from 
debilitating long-term symptoms after they had cleared the virus, and numerous reports emerged 
of people contracting the virus more than once (Torres et al. 2020).  
 This new information, which became widely publicized during the fall of 2020, as our 
understanding of the disease improved, paints the virus in a more threatening light. This then 
begs the question, if partisan’s directional goals in reasoning are limited by their ability to 
construct a reasonable justification for directional conclusions, will some voters, namely those 
high in disease threat sensitivity, update their views of COVID in light of the new information 
(e.g. Kunda 1990; Redlawsk et al. 2010)? Following the logic of Kunda’s (1990) original 
argument, they should. She asserted that people are not at liberty to believe whatever they want 
to believe and are limited by their ability to construct reasonable justifications for their beliefs 




Applied to partisan motivated reasoning, David Redlawsk and his colleagues (2010) explored 
whether there comes a point at which partisans encounter enough contradictory information that 
they begin to update their stances in line with the evidence. And they find that this point does 
indeed exist. At first, their subjects doubled down on their initial attitudes in light of contrary 
evidence (e.g. Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006); but once enough contradictory information 
was presented, subjects began to update their attitudes in line with that information (Redlawsk et 
al., 2010). These authors termed the point at which people began to update their initial attitudes 
the “affective tipping point3.”  
 I argue that individuals vary in the point at which they reach their “affective” tipping 
points and begin to update positions in line with evidence. Once again, I posit that this variation 
is systematic and determined in part by contextually relevant personality constructs. Like above, 
I argue that individuals higher in PVD should reach their affective tipping points sooner, because 
explaining away information regarding the severity of the virus to construct a justification for 
inaccurate beliefs is more difficult for those who feel vulnerable to infectious disease threats. 
Again, as Democrats also have partisan motivations to perceive the virus as seriously harmful, I 
argue that the effect of PVD should be stronger for Republicans compared to Democrats, who if 
they are lower in PVD could even double down in their original attitudes. Based on this logic I 
pose the following hypotheses:  
H3a: As the pandemic progresses, partisans who are high in PVD will reach their affective 
tipping points sooner than those who are lower in PVD.  
                                                           
3 I use the term “affective tipping point” to be consistent with the existing literature, but I am 
agnostic to the role of affect and discrete emotion concepts in this tipping point as the theoretical 
framework (e.g. Marcus et al., 2000) upon which the construct was built has been drawn into 
question in the past decade (see Barrett, 2017). 
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CHAPTER 5: HARM PERCEPTIONS AND ELITE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Why focus on subjective perceptions of COVID 19’s harmfulness as opposed to other 
beliefs surrounding the virus? The answer lies in the role that perceiving harm and suffering 
plays in the activation of a basic moral prototype in which people seek to hold an agent 
accountable for the harm they perceive (e.g. Gray and Wegner 2009; 2010; 2011; Gray et al. 
2012; Gray et al. 2014; Schein and Gray 2014; 2018). So, in the context of COVID 19, people 
who contract the virus are perceived as “suffering patients” if and only if the virus is perceived as 
posing the threat of serious harm to its victims. Crucially, once the virus is perceived as harmful, 
partisans will be inclined towards holding an agent responsible for the harm caused by the virus. 
Based on this logic, I posit:  
H4a: As harm perceptions increase, rank and file partisans will attribute more blame for the crisis 
to political actors.  
H4b: Republicans who perceive more harm will attribute more blame for the crisis to Trump 








CHAPTER 6: STUDY 1 
Data and Methods  
 Study one is a cross sectional investigation testing the early effects of partisan motivated 
reasoning on harm perceptions and in turn, the influence of harm perceptions on blame 
attribution across partisan lines. In particular, this study tested hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 4a, and 4b.  
Hypotheses were tested in a diverse national sample (N = 1885) recruited through Qualtrics 
panels to meet national census benchmarks on demographic variables. Data were collected in 
early June 2020. The study was one of several included in a larger collection of studies fielded 
by researchers at (blinded for review) intended to understand the role of partisanship in shaping 
voters’ responses to the COVID 19 pandemic.  
All respondents completed measures of standard demographic control variables as well as 
standard measures of partisanship. Specific wording of the partisanship and control variables is 
provided in Appendix A. All individuals included in the present analyses also completed a brief 
measure of PVD, a measure of COVID 19 harm perception, and were given the choice to ascribe 
a degree of blame for the COVID 19 pandemic to a number of elite agents.  
 The PVD measure employed here was shortened from its original form to include three 
highly loading items that captured the construct of interest in the modern context (e.g. an item 
regarding phone booths was discarded because it was no longer contextually relevant). Three 
items were selected to capture PI:  
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• In general, I am very susceptible to colds, flus, and other infectious diseases.” 
• “My immune system protects me from most illnesses that other people get.”  
• “If an illness is going around, I will get it.” 
 Respondents rated their agreement with these statements on a 7-point scale ranging from 1- 
Strongly agree to 7- Strongly disagree. Item number 2 was reverse coded (α= .65). Three items 
were selected to capture GA:  
• “When possible, I avoid using public restrooms because of the risk I may catch 
something from the previous user.”  
• “I dislike wearing used clothes because you do not know what the last person who wore it 
was like.”  
• “I do not like to use a pencil someone else has obviously chewed on.”  
Again, respondents rated agreement with the statements on the same 7-point scale (α = .65)4.  
In line with the previous literature (Duncan et al. 2009; Makhanova and Shepherd 2020) 
the two factors of PVD were slightly to moderately correlated with each other (r = .19). Neither 
factor showed much of a relationship with partisanship in this sample (r PI/ Republican = -.07, r 
GA/ Republican= .004).  
 Once they completed the PVD measure, respondents were later posed the question, 
“Americans disagree about whether the COVID virus poses a serious health risk to those who 
catch it or whether it is no more harmful than the flu or a cold. How much do you think most 
people who catch the virus suffer because of their infection?” Respondents then rated their 
positions on a thermometer ranging from 1- Not noticeably to 10- Serious illness with risk of 
death, with a scale midpoint of 5- Like a bad flu (mean = 7.31, sd =1.94).  
                                                           
4 Though alphas were lower than standard, given the brief three item nature of the measure for 
each factor, and previous guidance regarding deflation of alpha on brief measures (see Schmitt, 
1996) I proceeded as usual with analyses. 
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 Finally, respondents were given the opportunity to indicate whether they held a number 
of actors responsible for the harm caused by the virus. A set of six potential targets commonly 
given as scapegoats by out-party elites and media organizations were listed, as well as a seventh 
option subjects could select indicating that they did not hold anyone responsible for the harm 
caused by the virus. The six potential targets were the CDC, governors who refused to order 
social distancing measures in their states, people who refuse to social distance, US President 
Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi, and US President Barack Obama. Once subjects indicated 
whether they thought an agent bared responsibility for the crisis, they were led to a second 
question in which they indicated how much responsibility they felt was attributable to each 
selected actor on a scale ranging from zero percent of the responsibility to one hundred percent. 
Responsibility was not constrained to add to one hundred across targets as people lack the 
numeracy to limit how much responsibility they attribute to various agents based on the rules of 
percentages in everyday life. All targets were included in the analyses presented here aside from 
President Obama as too few subjects attributed blame for the crisis for a model to be adequately 
powered (though results are presented in Appendix B in the interest of full disclosure). 
Results and Discussion  
Results of the model are presented in Figure 1 below and full model results including 
demographic controls are presented in Appendix B. Overall, results supported the mechanism 
proposed here. Regardless of partisanship, the Germ Aversion factor of PVD had a significant 
effect on COVID harm perception (β GA Democrat = .07, p < .001; β GA*Independent = 0, p > 
.05; β GA*Republican = .03, p > .05). Moreover, in line with hypothesis 2 b the Perceived 
Infectability factor of PVD differentially impacted perceived harmfulness by party (β PI 
Democrat = .02 p > .05; β PI*Republican = .09, p < .001; β PI*Independent = .07 p < .05). As 
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displayed in Figure 1, going from the scale minimum (three) to the scale maximum (twenty-one) 
of PI exerted a stronger influence on perceptions of COVID harmfulness for Republicans 
(predicted value at scale minimum = 5.46, predicted value at scale maximum = 7.48) than for 
Democrats (min = 6.81, max = 7.21) and Independents (min = 5.7, max = 7.38). The influence of 
the Germ Aversion factor is also presented in Figure 1. Though partisan differences in the 
influence of Germ Aversion appear in the predicted pattern, Germ Aversion does not exert a 
















Figure 1: PVD Exerts a Stronger Influence on the Harm Perceptions of Republicans 
 
Figure one displays predicted harm perceptions by party at the scale minimum (three) and scale maximum 
(twenty-one) of Perceived Infectability (PI) and Germ Aversion (GA). Predicted harm perceptions were 
obtained with model 1. Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates. Full results 
of model one including ordinal control variables are provided in Appendix B.  
A second set of linear regression models were run to test hypothesis 4a. The DV in the 
second set of models was the percentage of responsibility attributed to each elite agent in the 
question given above. The set of models illuminate the impact of harm perceptions on 
attributions of responsibility. Results of the models are presented in Figure 2 below as well as the 
table in Appendix C. Controlling for relevant covariates including partisanship, across all agents’ 
subjects could blame, perceiving the virus as harmful was a significant predictor of attributing 
more responsibility to the agent in question, in line with the hypothesis posed here (β Harm 
Trump = 2.73, p <. 001; β Harm Xi/China = 1.16, p < .01; β Harm CDC = 2.51, p <.01; β Harm 
Governors = 3.56, p <.001; β Harm Those who do not social distance = 3.27, p < .001). 
Importantly as indicated by the standardized coefficients (Gelman, 2008) presented in Figure 2, 
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perceiving harm is consistently at least as strong of a predictor of attributing blame to an agent 
than partisanship.  
Figure 2: Perceiving Harm Predicts Attributing More Responsibility 
 
Figure Two displays regression coefficients for variables of interest in the five models run to test 
hypothesis 4a. Harm was standardized in line with Gelman (2008) by dividing by two times the standard 
deviation of the variable for visual comparison with the binary partisanship variables. Unstandardized 
coefficients are presented in the text. Full model results are provided in table form in Appendix C.  
The main model of interest in testing hypothesis 4b was a model investigating the 
influence of perceiving harm on blaming President Trump for the pandemic by party. Results are 
presented in Table 1 below as well as Figure 3. Again, in line with hypotheses, the influence of 
harm on attributions of blame to Trump was greater for Republicans (β Harm*Republican = 
3.37, p < .01) than Democrats (β Harm Democrat = 2.30, p < .001). Party alone was also a 
significant predictor of blaming Trump for the crisis, with Republicans (β Republican = -36.61, p 
< .01) attributing less blame for the crisis to Trump than Democrats (Intercept = 68.73). Results 
indicate that though party is an important predictor of attributing blame to Trump, so too are 
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harm perceptions, especially for those who have been led by their personalities to overcome 
partisan biases in reasoning and accurately perceive the virus as harmful.  
Figure 3: Republicans Who Perceive COVID as Harmful Attribute More Blame to President 
Trump than Those Who Perceive Less Harm 
 
Figure three displays predicted attributions of responsibility to Donald Trump by party depending on the 

















(Standard Error)  
Intercept (Baseline Democrat) 68.73  
(8.113) 










Multiple R Squared: .12 Adjusted R Squared: .08 
N: 797 Significance: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, 
*** = p < .001 
 
Table one above displays regression results for those citizens who chose to attribute some degree of 
blame for the COVID 19 crisis to Donald Trump (note, participants were not required to attribute blame 
to Trump). The full model including categorical demographic control variables is provided in the 
Appendix D. 
In sum, study one provides evidence in support of hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. These findings 
demonstrate that though partisan perceptual biases are vital in shaping subjective perceptions of 
the world, other psychological characteristics can moderate their influence. There are important 
instances where contextually relevant personality variables condition the effect of partisanship 
on reasoning. In the following section, I build on these findings by examining panel data relating 
to harm perceptions over time. As constructing justifications in the face of competing evidence 
should be more difficult for those high in PVD, I argue that PVD should predict adjusting harm 
perceptions upwards over time, once again signaling the influence of contextually relevant 
personality variables on motivated reasoning processes. Again, I argue that the influence of PVD 
should be particularly meaningful for Republicans, whose partisan predilections should lead 
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CHAPTER 7: STUDY 2 
Data and Methods  
In this study, harm perceptions were examined across two waves of a panel study 
consisting of a diverse sample of American voters (n = 650). Wave 1 was conducted early in the 
pandemic, in early June 2020; wave 2 was conducting at the beginning of the pandemic’s, 
second, and more severe fall wave in early November 2020.  The panel study was conducted by 
researchers at (blinded for review), again through Qualtrics panels, to investigate the role of 
political attachments in structuring COVID-19 beliefs and behaviors. Wave 1 is synonymous 
with Study 1 above and thus all n = 650 citizens included in this panel investigation were also 
included in Study 1.  
 Harm perceptions were assessed with the same ten-point measure used in Study 1 (mean 
= 7.41, sd =  2.01).  Likewise, partisanship, education, income, gender, and race were all 
measured as they were in Study 1 (see Appendix A for a discussion of measures). 
Results and Discussion  
Two regression models investigating the role of PVD and partisanship in predicting change in 
harm perceptions over time were run to investigate hypotheses 3a and 3b. The first model was a 
first order model with terms for partisanship, PVD, and control variables. The second model 
included additional interaction terms to test the hypothesized conditional impact of PVD on harm 
perceptions over time by party.  
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Results of the first model, with the coefficients for Perceived Infectability and Germ 
Aversion standardized in line with Gelman (2008) for visual comparison with partisanship, are 
presented in Figure 4 below. Full model results including coefficients for demographic control 
variables are provided in the table presented in Appendix E. Partisanship emerged as the 
strongest predictor of changes in harm perceptions over time such that Republicans (β 
Republican = -.87, p < .001) and Independents (β Independent = -.56, p < .01) updated their 
harm perceptions less overall than Democrats at baseline. More importantly, PVD subscales 
perform in line with hypothesis 3a: PI resulted in a .06 increase in harm perceptions per one unit 
change in PI (p < .01), whereas GA exerted a smaller, but still significant influence on change in 
harm perceptions (β GA = .04, p < .05). In sum, the model provides support for hypothesis 3a, 
over time, PVD measured at time 1 predicts updating harm perceptions in line with objective 












Figure 4: The Impact of Partisanship and Perceived Vulnerability to Infectious Disease on the 
Propensity to Update Harm Perceptions Over Time 
 
Figure Four displays the coefficients for variables of interest in the first order model conducted to test 
hypothesis 3a. PVD has again been standardized in line with Gelman (2008) for visual comparison with 
the binary partisanship variables, though unstandardized coefficients are presented in text. The full model 
along with demographic controls is provided in Appendix E. 
 The second model included the addition of PVD by Party interaction terms; PVD should 
exert a stronger influence on the propensity of Republicans to change their harm perceptions than 
Democrats, who also possess partisan motivations to update their harm perceptions. The results 
of the second model are presented in Table 2 below. Partisanship was a strong predictor of 
change in harm perceptions over time (β Republican = -1.96, p < .001; β Independent = - 2.32, p 
< .01). Perceived Infectability and Germ Aversion did not exert a significant influence on the 
propensity of Democrats to update their harm perceptions (β PI Democrats = .04, p > .05; β GA 
Democrats = -.005, p > .05). However, Germ Aversion significantly interacted with partisanship 
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such that for Republicans, Germ Aversion significantly predicted adjusting harm perceptions 
upwards in line with emerging evidence about COVID 19 (β GA* Republican = .08, p < .05). 
Other interaction terms with the factors of PVD and partisanship emerged in the hypothesized 
direction but did not reach statistical significance at a level of α = .05 (β PI*Independent = .09, p 
> .05; β Republican*PI = .004, p > .05; β GA*Independent = .06, p > .05).  
Table 2: Republicans High in PVD Are More Likely to Update Harm Perceptions Over Time 
Compared to Those Low in PVD 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard Error)  
Intercept 2.67 
(.94) 
Harm Wave 1 .48 
(.03)*** 
















R squared = .45  Adjusted R Squared = .41 
N = 650  Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p <.01, 
*** = p <.001 
Table two displays results for the second order model conducted to test hypothesis 3b. Values in 
parentheses represent standard errors. The full model including demographic controls is included in 
Appendix F.  
 In conclusion, study 2 provides evidence in support of the mechanism articulated here. 
Over time, PVD predicts the reaching of an affective tipping point, that requires citizens to 
update their perceptions of COVID harmfulness in line with relevant facts about the virus. 
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Evidence is also found in support of the hypothesis that PVD exerts a larger influence on the 
harm perceptions of Republicans, who have partisan, directional motives to double down in their 
existing harm perceptions in light of contradictory evidence. Though the theory articulated here 
is agnostic to specific roles for the two factors of PVD in shaping harm perceptions, it is possible 
that the affective nature of the GA factor (discussed above) was more influential in predicting the 
point at which Republicans would reach their affective tipping points than the arguably less 
affectively laden PI factor (see Duncan et al. 2009). Future research investigating the influence 
of PVD on motivated cognition surrounding the coronavirus pandemic should further explore 














CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A key finding in political science is that partisans are largely unable to accurately 
perceive the objective conditions of the world and hold elites responsible for their policy failures 
that contributed to those conditions (e.g. Achen and Bartels 2017). Instead, they engage in biased 
processing of objective conditions in part through partisan motivated reasoning, selecting and 
interpreting information in line with their partisan predilections (e.g. Kunda 1990; Taber and 
Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992; Lenz 2013). This process has been only exacerbated by record levels 
of political polarization (see Druckman et al. 2013; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015).   
 Using the Coronavirus pandemic of 2020 as a test case, my theory adds a vital caveat to 
the general pattern depicted above. Across two studies, I demonstrate that though partisanship 
does shape perceptions of the pandemic (Hypothesis 1), the impact is moderated at the individual 
level by a contextually relevant personality construct which can lead partisans to perceive 
objective reality more accurately. 
In the context of the COVID 19 pandemic, the personality construct of Perceived 
Vulnerability to Infectious Disease (Duncan et al. 2009; Makhanova and Shepherd 2020) exerts 
as strong of an influence as partisanship on perceptions of how harmful the Coronavirus 
ultimately is (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, the PI factor of PVD moderates the influence of 
partisanship on harm perceptions. Indeed, going from the minimum to the maximum on the PI 
factor of PVD eliminates the influence of being a Republican on COVID 19 harm perceptions 
(Hypothesis 2b).  
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Likewise, I find strong evidence across two waves of a panel study, that PVD measured 
at time one predicts updating COVID harm perceptions at time two. Specifically, citizens higher 
in PVD are more likely to increase their perceptions of COVID harmfulness over time in line 
with objective evidence compared to those who are lower in PVD (Hypothesis 3a). This signals 
that voters who are high in PVD are led by their personalities to reach their affective tipping 
points, at which perceptions must begin to be updated in line with evidence, sooner than those 
who are lower in PVD.  
 Secondly, those who perceive COVID 19 as harmful are more likely to hold political 
actors responsible for the crisis (Hypothesis 4a). In particular, as Republicans in particular 
overcame directional goals in reasoning to accurately perceive COVID as harmful, they 
attributed more responsibility for the crisis to Donald Trump (Hypothesis 4b) for his clear and 
continued fumbling of the crisis than Republicans who did not perceive COVID as harmful.  
 This series of findings adds a critical caveat to the literature on politically motivated 
reasoning and elite accountability: voters can be led by their personalities to be more or less 
likely to engage in partisan motivated reasoning about an issue. When personality leads them to 
overcome partisan biases in motivated reasoning regarding harmfulness, partisans attribute 
blame for crises to political actors (see also Bisgaard, 2015).  
 Despite finding strong evidence in support of the central claims of this paper: that 
contextually relevant personality variables constrain the influence of partisanship on motivated 
reasoning, and that accurately perceiving harm can in turn lead rank and file voters to hold elites 
accountable for their role in crises, a few points of caution are worth mentioning. For one, future 
work should seek to further explore whether personality constrains motivated reasoning 
processes in a controlled experimental setting.  
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Likewise, while the reasoning processes depicted herein are likely domain general, I do 
test them in a single context: that of the COVID 19 pandemic of 2020-2021. So, future work 
should seek to expand the theory presented herein to other political events and policy issues. For 
instance, it is likely that other individual difference level constructs such as Identification with 
All Humanity (e.g. McFarland et al. 2012) would condition the influence of partisanship on 
motivated cognitive processes about events such as the War on Terror, particularly among 
Republicans. Similarly, other constructs such as Belief in a Just World and Belief in an Unjust 
World might condition the influence of partisanship on perceptions surrounding redistributive 
economic policies for Democrats and Republicans respectively (e.g. Lerner 1965; 1980; Lench 
and Chang 2007).  
In conclusion, while citizens are certainly not the rational actors depicted in folk theories 
of democracy, neither are they always single minded partisan motivated reasoners, incapable of 
accurately perceiving the world and holding elites accountable, depicted in the political behavior 
literature. I find that at times, personality can influence politically motivated reasoning leading 
individual citizens to deviate in systematic ways from overarching partisan patterns. Indeed, 
when personality leads partisans to accurately perceive harm, perceptions of harm can, in turn, 








APPENDIX A: WORDING OF DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL QUESTIONS 
Please respond to the following questions.  
gender How would you describe your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other (specify)  (3) ________________________________________________ 
race How would you describe your race or ethnicity? 
o White, non-Hispanic  (1)  
o Black or African American, non-Hispanic  (2)  
o Latino, Latinx, or Hispanic  (3)  
o Asian  (4)  
o American Indian or Alaska Native  (5)  
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  (6)  
o other  (7)  
edu What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?  
o Less than high school degree  (1)  
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)  (4)  
o Some college but no degree  (5)  
o Associate degree in college (2-year)  (6)  
o Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)  (7)  
o Master's degree  (8)  
o Doctoral degree  (9)  
o Professional degree (JD, MD)  (10)  
income Please indicate your yearly household income.  
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o Less than $10,000  (1)  
o $10,000 - $19,999  (2)  
o $20,000 - $29,999  (3)  
o $30,000 - $39,999  (4)  
o $40,000 - $49,999  (5)  
o $50,000 - $59,999  (6)  
o $60,000 - $69,999  (7)  
o $70,000 - $79,999  (8)  
o $80,000 - $89,999  (9)  
o $90,000 - $99,999  (10)  
o $100,000 - $149,999  (11)  
o More than $150,000  (12)  
age Please select your age.  
o Under 18  (1)  
o 18 - 24  (2)  
o 25 - 34  (3)  
o 35 - 44  (4)  
o 45 - 54  (5)  
o 55 - 64  (6)  
o 65 - 74  (7)  
o 75 - 84  (8)  
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o 85 or older  (9)  
pid Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a DEMOCRAT, a REPUBLICAN, an 
INDEPENDENT, or what? 
o Democrat  (1)  
o Republican  (2)  
o Independent  (3)  
o No preference  (4)  
o Other party (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
lean Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? (if 
independent selected) 
o Closer to Republican  (1)  
o Closer to Democratic  (2)  

















APPENDIX B TABLE B-1: FULL RESULTS FOR MODEL 1 
                                Variable                                                            Coefficient 
                                                                                                          (Std. Error) 
 Model 1 
(Intercept) 5.73 *** 
 (0.48)   
Independent -1.36 *   
 (0.55)   
Republican                                                            -2.05 *** 
 (0.36)   
Black 0.21    
 (0.14)   
Hispanic/Latinx/Latino 0.48 *** 
 (0.13)   
Asian 0.28    
 (0.17)   
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.08    
 (0.55)   
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.77    
 (1.27)   
Other 0.28    
 (0.38)   
Female 0.27 **  
 (0.09)   
Other gender 2.65    
 (1.84)   
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$10,000-19,999 0.49    
 (0.26)   
$20,000-29,999 0.59 *  
 (0.25)   
$30,000-39,999 0.35    
 (0.25)   
$40,000-49,999 0.33    
 (0.25)   
$50,000-59,999 0.39    
 (0.26)   
$60,000-69,999 -0.01    
 (0.26)   
$70,000-79,999 0.53 *  
 (0.26)   
$80,000-$89,999 0.32    
 (0.28)   
$90,000-99,999 0.22    
 (0.27)   
$100,000-$149,999 0.15    
 (0.24)   
$150,000 and up  0.15    
 (0.25)   
High school or equivalent -0.29    
 (0.32)   
Some college  -0.20    
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 (0.32)   
Associate’s degree -0.26    
 (0.36)   
Bachelor’s degree -0.37    
 (0.33)   
Master’s degree -0.11    
 (0.34)   
Doctoral degree 0.13    
 (0.48)   
Professional degree -0.21    
 (0.42)   
25-34 0.16    
 (0.18)   
35-44 0.37 *  
 (0.18)   
45-54 0.23    
 (0.18)   
55-64 0.51 **  
 (0.18)   
65-74 0.87 *** 
 (0.18)   
75-84 1.07 *** 
 (0.24)   
85 and older 0.98    
 (0.59)   
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PI 0.02    
 (0.02)   
GA 0.07 *** 
 (0.01)   
Independent:PI 0.07 *  
 (0.04)   
Republican:PI 0.09 *** 
 (0.03)   
Independent:GA 0.00    
 (0.03)   
Republican:GA 0.03    
 (0.02)   
N 1885       
R2 0.16    














APPENDIX C: TABLE C1: FULL RESULTS FOR HARM AND RESULTS FOR HARM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
ATTRIBUTIONS ACROSS TARGETS 






        
(Intercept) 65.72 *** 66.86 *** 41.98 ** 49.71 *** 37.28 *** 2.16     
 (8.15)   (7.52)   (15.25)  (10.68)   (7.74)   (47.36)    
Harm 2.73 *** 1.16 **  2.51 ** 3.56 *** 3.27 *** 3.14     
 (0.45)   (0.40)   (0.77)  (0.55)   (0.43)   (1.75)    
Independent -2.73    7.59 **  4.74   2.07    1.96    3.12     
 (2.52)   (2.51)   (4.26)  (2.91)   (2.28)   (15.37)    
Republican -7.67 *** 11.92 *** 6.06   1.26    -0.75    38.67 ***  
 (2.25)   (1.76)   (3.39)  (2.32)   (1.70)   (8.31)    
25-34 3.33    7.68 *  11.84 *  2.95    1.51    22.46     















-1.85    4.07    14.77     
 (3.09)   (3.64)   (5.66)  
 
 
(3.75)   (3.07)   (16.73)    
45-54 7.66 *  9.57 **  2.74   
 
4.62    5.72    9.96     
 (3.08)   (3.55)   (5.36)  (3.82)   (3.03)   (17.58)    
55-64 10.79 *** 10.69 **  6.64   3.28    5.61    -8.21     
 (3.16)   (3.61)   (5.96)  (3.82)   (3.07)   (16.26)    
65-74 9.00 **  11.10 **  8.63   0.60    4.34    -0.30     
 (3.03)   (3.59)   (5.62)  (3.77)   (3.02)   (18.00)    
75-84 6.52    9.12 *  4.86   -0.84    7.07            
 (4.72)   (4.49)   (9.31)  (5.20)   (4.34)           
85 and up 5.89    17.11          -3.91    -4.06    -27.27     






$10,000-19,999 -6.58    -7.95    -21.11 *  -3.02    -0.88    9.21     
 (4.61)   (4.74)   (8.66)  (6.80)   (5.27)   (20.51)    
$20,000-29,999 -2.22    -7.10    -17.63 *  1.73    2.42    2.35     
 (4.38)   (4.59)   (8.73)  (6.55)   (5.04)   (24.97)    
  $30,000-39,999 -7.39    -4.06    -13.83   3.61    -0.41    4.06     
 (4.32)   (4.56)   (8.91)  (6.58)   (5.02)   (21.07)    
$40,000-49,999 0.07    -5.64    -17.64 *  6.39    4.11    -1.98     
 (4.44)   (4.61)   (8.38)  (6.55)   (5.04)   (20.44)    
$50,000-59,999 -4.86    -6.64    -19.50   0.95    -2.20    -14.65     
 (4.45)   (4.62)   (9.91)  (6.71)   (5.10)   (24.15)    
$60,000-69,999 -1.94    -2.85    -20.32 *  4.15    2.85    4.76     
 (4.49)   (4.80)   (9.21)  (6.70)   (5.13)   (22.14)    
$70,000-79,999 -2.74    -2.82    -15.41   1.43    -1.57    4.93     
 (4.47)   (4.91)   (8.80)  (6.69)   (5.04)   (20.91)    
$80,000-89,999 1.17    -4.36    -24.26 ** 5.41    -2.48    13.53     
 (5.15)   (5.05)   (9.17)  (7.20)   (5.69)   (22.60)    






 (4.82)   (4.97)   (9.06)  (6.96)   (5.37)   (19.08)    
$100,000-$149,999 -4.31    -3.14    -22.37 ** 4.50    -3.66    -4.89     
 (4.21)   (4.46)   (8.56)  (6.47)   (4.87)   (19.32)    
$150,000 and up  -3.57    -3.34    -21.56 *  6.29    -0.26    -8.17     
 (4.50)   (4.68)   (9.05)  (6.71)   (5.09)   (19.44)    
  High school or equivalent -6.63    -4.72    15.10   -10.36    3.14    12.44     
 (6.20)   (5.47)   (11.85)  (7.78)   (5.36)   (35.09)    
Some college -6.54    -6.62    15.22   -11.53    5.97    22.38     
 (6.29)   (5.72)   (12.31)  (7.90)   (5.48)   (35.61)    
Associate’s degree -5.46    -2.66    18.71   -16.08    4.47    18.94     
 (7.00)   (6.34)   (13.50)  (8.70)   (6.23)   (35.88)    
Bachelor’s degree -8.94    -9.20    11.52   -20.67 **  2.15    14.11     
 (6.30)   (5.65)   (12.25)  (7.91)   (5.51)   (36.36)    
Master’s degree -7.30    -9.25    19.72   -16.08 *  6.08    12.35     
 (6.47)   (6.04)   (12.74)  (8.14)   (5.76)   (37.07)    
Doctoral degree -3.89    -6.86    9.89   -24.81 *  7.91    -1.23     






Professional degree -13.86    -14.78 *   10.16   -17.24    -6.80    41.05     
 (8.43)   (7.32)   (16.35)  (10.49)   (8.16)   (39.99)    
Black -0.53    6.53 *  -2.59   -2.36    -2.87    4.69     
 (2.24)   (2.74)   (5.08)  (2.91)   (2.28)   (13.91)    
Hispanic/Latino/Latinx 0.23    4.39    -0.14   5.71 *  5.38 *  -14.08     
 (2.11)   (2.51)   (4.41)  (2.56)   (2.09)   (13.67)    
Asian 0.32    -1.13    -2.61   3.05    3.85    -10.20     
 (2.73)   (3.20)   (4.82)  (3.29)   (2.63)   (14.22)    
American Indian or Alaska Native 2.53    2.39    -10.94   -2.14    7.46    11.10     
 (8.61)   (9.43)   (12.28)  (16.29)   (15.40)   (21.58)    
Other 4.34    -15.12    -18.94   -8.31    -4.93    35.33     
 (6.74)   (7.86)   (17.86)  (7.75)   (7.30)   (35.01)    
Female -1.08    -0.27    -0.61   2.72    3.99 **  0.08     
 (1.58)   (1.60)   (3.08)  (1.89)   (1.50)   (8.31)    
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander        7.49          8.49    -5.28            
        (20.63)         (22.84)   (21.62)           






R2 0.11    0.12    0.18   0.14    0.12    0.53     
 *** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. Note: people were not forced to attribute blame to agents and could do chose to do 





















(Standard Error)  
Intercept (Baseline Democrat) 68.73  
(8.113) 





















































85 and older 6.98 
(9.61) 
High school or equivalent -7.08 
(6.18) 
Associates degree -6.85 
(6.27) 
Some college no degree -6.05 
(6.99) 
Bachelor’s degree -9.13 
(6.28) 
Master’s degree -7.94  
(6.45) 
Doctoral degree -4.29 
(8.90) 








Multiple R Squared: .12 Adjusted R Squared: .08 
N: 797 Significance: * = p <.05, ** = p < .01, 
*** = p < .001 
 
Table one above displays regression results for those citizens who chose to attribute some degree of 
blame for the COVID 19 crisis to Donald Trump. Perceiving the virus as harmful, in addition to 
partisanship leads to a greater attribution of responsibility for the crisis to Trump. Not only do 
Republicans who perceive harm attribute more blame to Trump than those who don’t in line with 







APPENDIX E TABLE E1 CHANGE IN HARM PERCEPTIONS OVER TIME WITH NO 
INTERACTION TERM 
                                         Variable                                                                         Coefficient 
                                                                                                                                 (Standard Error) 
 Change in 
Harm 
Over Time  
(Intercept) 1.75 *  
 (0.88)   
Harm 0.49 *** 
 (0.04)   
Independent -0.56 **  
 (0.21)   
Republican -0.87 *** 
 (0.14)   
GA 0.04 *  
 (0.01)   
PI 0.06 **  
 (0.02)   
25-34 1.48 *  
 (0.59)   
35-44 1.41 *  
 (0.58)   
45-54 1.37 *  
 (0.57)   




 (0.57)   
65-74 1.91 *** 
 (0.57)   
75-84 2.11 *** 
 (0.60)   
85 and up  2.42 *  
 (1.06)   
$10,000-19,999 -0.32    
 (0.49)   
$20,000-29,999 -0.47    
 (0.50)   
$30,000-39,999 -0.80    
 (0.48)   
$40,000-49,999 -0.45    
 (0.48)   
$50,000-59,999 -0.31    
 (0.48)   
$60,000-$69,999 -0.67    
 (0.48)   
$70,000-79,999 -0.69    
 (0.49)   
$80,000-89,999 -0.59    
 (0.51)   




 (0.50)   
$100,000-149,999 -0.80    
 (0.46)   
$150,000 and up -0.20    
 (0.49)   
High school or equivalent 0.37    
 (0.46)   
 Some college 0.41    
 (0.48)   
Associate’s degree 0.77    
 (0.55)   
Bachelor’s degree 0.33    
 (0.49)   
Master’s degree 0.33    
 (0.51)   
Doctoral degree 1.02    
 (0.73)   
Professional degree -1.33    
 (0.68)   
Female -0.01    
 (0.13)   
Black 0.06    
 (0.22)   




 (0.24)   
Asian -0.17    
 (0.28)   
American Indian or Alaska Native -2.72 *  
 (1.12)   
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander -1.63    
 (1.55)   
Other -0.02    
 (0.70)   
N 651       
R2 0.44    














APPENDIX F TABLE F1 FULL MODEL RESULTS INCLUDING CATEGORICAL 
CONTROLS FOR LONGITUDINAL PVD*PARTY INTERACTION 
Variable Coefficient 
(Standard Error)  
Intercept 2.67 
(.94) 
Harm Wave 1 .48 
(.03)*** 













































$150,000 and up  -.29 
(.48) 
High school or equivalent .42 
(.46) 
Some college .41 
(.48) 
Associates degree .80 
(.54) 
Bachelor’s degree .44 
(.49) 
Master’s degree .35 
(.51) 
Doctoral degree 1.16 
(.73) 










American Indian or Alaska Native  -2.84  
(1.12)* 












R squared = .45  Adjusted R Squared = .41 
N = 650  Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p <.01, 
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